Based on a panel data model this paper investigates whether the effects of fiscal policy on national saving in Europe have changed after the Maastricht Treaty came into force. Recently Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) found evidence that national saving responds nonlinearly to fiscal policy when a large and persistent consolidation is undertaken. I show that their finding is not robust, one reason being that the structural budget deficit is not a time-invariant criterion for identifying episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses. This paper proposes and analyses an alternative definition of a fiscal consolidation episode: the post-Maastricht period.
Introduction
Fiscal consolidation has been on the agenda of policy makers around the world for most of the past decade. In a number of countries budgetary trends were judged to be unsustainable in the mid-80s. Among those countries that undertook a rigorous turnaround in fiscal policy at that time were Denmark and Ireland. Surprisingly, fiscal contraction did not entail an economic downturn in these countries. In both cases, the decline in public expenditure was more than offset by the strong rise in private consumption and investment. This observation was at odds with mainstream economic beliefs concerning the short-run economic effects of fiscal policy, and subsequently a large body of literature has evolved trying to find a rationale for the seemingly "perverse" effects of fiscal consolidation. A seminal contribution to the field was made by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) who advanced the hypothesis that expectational effects were responsible for the positive outcome. According to this view, fiscal consolidation can lead to improved expectations about long-term growth and be followed by an increase rather than a reduction in current private-sector spending.
However, the profession has not yet reached a consensus on the effects of fiscal consolidation. This is no surprise since there is also strong disagreement among economists about the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy during "normal" times. In a recent survey, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) report that the issue whether budget deficits have Keynesian, neoclassical or Ricardian effects on the economy 1 has not yet been settled. An empirical selection of the appropriate school is difficult since the theories have observationally equivalent implications in some respects. For instance, the Keynesian and the neoclassical view agree that fiscal consolidation leads to an increase in national saving whereas Ricardian Equivalence predicts that national saving is not affected. 2 The literature on the effects of fiscal consolidation adds to this uncertainty by claiming that -under certain circumstances -the 1 For an exposition of these alternative views see Barro (1989) , Bernheim (1989) and Eisner (1989) . 2 If and only if, fiscal consolidation is achieved by an increase in non-distorting taxes, taking the path of government expenditure as given.
impact of budget deficits on national saving (and other macroeconomic variables) can be reversed.
The literature analyzing fiscal consolidation episodes can be divided into two major branches. The first, building on the work of Perotti (1995, 1996) , concentrates on the factors affecting the success and failure of fiscal contractions. A successful consolidation is defined in terms of reaching the goal of a permanent reduction in the government debt -GDP ratio. Recently, Heylen and Everaert (2000) have tested the most frequently cited hypotheses explaining the outcome of fiscal consolidations: first, the composition of the program, second, its size and persistence, third, the level and growth rate of public debt, fourth, the international macroeconomic environment and, fifth, exchange rate developments. Their results give support to all of these factors, apart from the size and persistence hypothesis which I will submit to extensive testing in the following. While having the merit of testing a variety of determinants in a single framework their conclusions have to be regarded with some caution as Heylen and
Everaert do not take account of the time-series dimension of the data in their regressions. 3 The second branch of the literature distinguishes itself by measuring the success of fiscal consolidations in terms of macroeconomic rather than fiscal outcomes. In a recent paper, Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) 4 have investigated the relationship between fiscal policy and national saving. Reviewing the main theoretical contributions, they conclude that this relationship may be nonlinear under certain circumstances. In a broad sense, the non-linearity arises from the influence of fiscal policy on private-sector expectations. In an environment where private agents feel that an unchanged policy stance is unsustainable and will sooner or later lead to economic disruptions, the implementation of a fiscal consolidation program can drastically improve the private sector's assessment of future income developments. Two propositions emerge from the theoretical literature: On the one hand, the analyses of Blanchard (1990) , Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) imply that the government debt -GDP ratio is the variable affecting private-sector expectations. Whenever the debt ratio is either near a critical value or grows at a rapid pace, a fiscal consolidation program does not lead to a rise in national saving: the private sector reacts to improved long-term prospects by dissaving more than the government saves. On the other hand, nonlinear fiscal policy effects may depend on the size and persistence of the fiscal impulse, as illustrated by Drazen (1990) . In a situation of unsustainable fiscal policy the private sector will only revise its expectations if the government gives a clear signal that it will permanently alter its course towards sound public finances. In their paper, Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (hence GJP) test both hypotheses in a panel data model, finding overwhelming support for the size and persistence proposition. The GJP analysis serves as a starting point for the present paper for the following reason.
Their results are of paramount importance for policy makers in the European Union. As can be seen in figure 1 European governments have gradually reduced budget deficits in the 1990s.
Still, most countries have refrained from drastic consolidation measures because they did not want to dampen economic growth that was already sluggish -during most of the 1990s the output gap as calculated by the OECD was negative. In contrast, the results reported in GJP should encourage European governments to intensify their efforts on the road to a balanced budget. Such action, they argue, could lead to stronger growth even in the short-run. However, it has to be asked whether their estimation results are robust since this is the precondition for useful policy advice. This question is addressed in the empirical application: I estimate national saving regressions for a panel of 14 EU countries 5 along the lines of GJP.
It is shown that their finding of a nonlinear relationship between fiscal policy and national saving might be spurious. This is due to two problems: (i) Panel data models do not allow for cross-country heterogeneity apart from a country-specific intercept. I find evidence for the proposition made by Haque, Pesaran and Sharma (2000) that the statistical significance of nonlinear effects in panel regressions could be spurious due to systematic slope heterogeneity.
(ii) The work of GJP and many other applied studies share a common problem: the identification of fiscal policy episodes. Usually, a large change in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance over two years is defined as a strong and persistent fiscal impulse. 6 Apart from the ad hoc character of this definition, this measure suffers from the extensive revisions of structural budget balances in the course of time. 7 In the remainder of the fourth section of this paper, I try to remedy the second problem and propose an alternative definition of a fiscal consolidation episode. In 1992, the year in which the Maastricht Treaty was signed, most countries in the European Union did not comply with the fiscal convergence criteria. If -which has been controversially discussed -European governments credibly committed to fiscal discipline at that time, the years from 1993 to the present can be regarded as a persistent fiscal consolidation episode. 8 Using this definition of a fiscal consolidation episode, the panel regressions are re-estimated. Again, I find no evidence for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy.
However, individual-country regressions imply that a non-linearity might be present in some cases. All in all, the results indicate that the case for non-linear or non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy is less stringent than claimed by parts of the literature.
5 Luxembourg is not included due to data (non)availability.
6 See, for example, OECD (1996) and GJP (2000) . 7 The structural budget balance is not only affected by revisions of the underlying net lending series, but also by the re-estimation of potential output. An example can highlight the point: Whereas the OECD (1996: 34) reported a cyclically-adjusted budget surplus of 0.5 per cent (in relation to potential GDP) for Australia for the year 1982, four years later (OECD 2000a) it reported a structural deficit of 3.6 per cent for the same country and year.
Episodes of Fiscal Contraction and Expansion
This section lays the ground for the subsequent empirical examination of the hypothesis that the effects of large and persistent fiscal impulses are opposed in sign from those of moderate fiscal impulses. In the literature, it is a common procedure to identify episodes of strong fiscal contraction and expansion with large and durable changes in the structural budget balance.
Following GJP (2000: 1268) I define a 'large and persistent fiscal impulse' as a change in the general government cyclically-adjusted budget balance equivalent to at least 1.5 percentage points of potential GDP per year over a two-year period. 9 This ensures that the results of this paper are directly comparable to theirs. Table 1 reports the episodes identified by GJP as well as the episodes I obtained using their definition of large and persistent fiscal expansions and
contractions.
An inspection of the table reveals that while GJP recovered 30 expansion and 51 consolidation episodes, I only obtain 7 and 6, respectively. A minor part of this divergence can be attributed to different data availability. For some countries, the OECD has omitted earlier data since the year of data collection (1997) by GJP due to revisions of national accounts. For instance, I
could not account for the very prominent fiscal consolidation episode of Denmark in the mid80s because the OECD (2000a) does not publish data on the structural budget balance before 1987 for this country anymore. Still, the largest part of deviation seems to be explained by data revisions. As was argued in the last section, structural balances are affected by revisions of unadjusted budget balances and of potential output. Probably some of GJP's significant fiscal impulses were only slightly above the 1.5 per-cent margin and are below it when considering more recent data. 10 Furthermore, even in those cases where my episodes correspond to those of GJP there is no perfect coincidence. Although there are some clear-cut episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses, the exact dating of these episodes is far from being uncontroversial. Abstracting from these problems for a moment, the empirical analysis of GJP will be re-conducted in section 4.2 in order to check for robustness of their results. Both sets of episodes will be considered in turn to avoid premature rejection of the evidence reported in GJP (2000) .
The strong sensitivity of this identification procedure already casts doubt on any results relying on these episodes. To avoid this source of uncertainty, an alternative concept will be analyzed in section 4.2: I propose to view the post-Maastricht period starting in 1993 as a fiscal consolidation episode. Indeed budget deficits have considerably decreased since that time throughout the European Union. However, for the expectations effects of fiscal consolidation to materialize it is necessary that the commitment of governments implied by the Maastricht Treaty was judged credible by the private sector ex ante. Unfortunately, the credibility assumption cannot be tested on historical data. It can only be established ex post that all countries made considerable efforts in order to qualify for European Monetary Union. While this caveat has to be kept in mind, the definition of the post-Maastricht era as a consolidation episode has the attractive feature of being time-invariant.
The Empirical Model
In this section, the empirical framework employed in section 4 is presented. Following the strategy of GJP (2000), I estimate single-equation fixed-effects models for a panel of 14 EU countries for the years 1970 to 2000. 11 The national saving rate (as a percentage of potential output) is chosen as the dependent variable. As GJP point out this allows one to relate the estimation results directly to the Ricardian equivalence proposition. While standard neoclassical theory predicts that national saving should respond positively to increases in taxes and negatively to increases in government spending, Ricardian equivalence implies that, for a given path of government expenditure, changes in (non-distorting) taxes and transfers have no effect on overall saving. Furthermore, if the 'size and persistence' hypothesis is correct the effects of fiscal policy on national saving mentioned for the neoclassical view should be dampened or even reversed during episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses. This hypothesis will be tested in section 4.
The following fixed-effects panel data model will be estimated: Sharma (2000) which is calculated as the arithmetic average of country-specific coefficients. 
Empirical Results

The Effects of Large and Persistent Fiscal Impulses: the GJP Approach
In this section the fixed-effects regressions reported in GJP (2000 GJP ( : 1274 are re-estimated. Table 2 It is not clear whether these findings should be interpreted as evidence in favor of the expectations view on the effects of large fiscal impulses. The statistically significant nonlinear effects reported in table 2 could be due to neglected cross-country heterogeneity. In order to check for this possibility equation [1] was estimated for each of the 14 individual countries.
The results are reported in table 3. The dummy variable capturing episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses corresponds exactly to the one used by GJP in their paper. As can be seen, there is overwhelming evidence of slope heterogeneity across individual countries.
Furthermore, not a single country exibits statistically significant nonlinear effects of fiscal policy. 14 , 15 The mean group estimator reported in the last row of table 3 corroborates this finding.
In an additional regression -not reported here 16 These results cast doubt on the validity of the evidence presented in GJP (2000) . Their finding of nonlinear effects of fiscal poliy on national saving is very probably due to neglected slope heterogeneity. In addition, the identification of fiscal episodes is ambiguous, as was pointed out earlier. All in all, it seems as though this approach cannot provide robust results. 
The Effects of Fiscal Policy on National Saving: Pre-and Post-Maastricht
In this section, I re-estimate the panel regressions using an alternative definition of fiscal consolidation episodes. The post-Maastricht period starting in 1993 is defined as a common consolidation episode for the 14 EU countries considered in this paper. Table 4 reports the estimation results. In a first regression a dummy, taking the value 1 between 1993 and 2000, was incorporated. As can be seen this variable is statistically significant which is an indication of a structural break. In a second regression (column 2 of table 4), it was checked whether this can be attributed to changing fiscal policy effects. For this purpose the tax and spending variables were interacted with the post-Maastricht dummy. The results show that there is no evidence for nonlinear effects. Rather the dynamics of national saving seem to have changed in the 1990s: in an additional regression -not reported here 17 -all independent variables were interacted with the dummy variable. Only the coefficient of interacted lagged national saving was statistically significant, with a positive sign. This suggests that the long-run effects of saving determinants may have increased in the 1990s. Remember that Greece and Italy are both characterized by high government debt -GDP ratios.
While exhibiting a comparatively low debt ratio Germany experienced a period of rapidly growing debt in the aftermath of unification.
These findings seem to support the theoretical models of Drazen (1990) and Perotti (1999) , both predicting that nonlinear effects are related to a critical situation or evolution of government debt. This conclusion might be premature, however. Most of the coefficients reported in table 5 are poorly estimated pointing to misspecification. Further research has to reconsider the case for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy in models with richer dynamics.
Unfortunately, high-frequency data on fiscal policy are not available for most EU countries so that it is impossible to estimate higher-order autoregressive distributed lag models.
Altogether, the results suggest that the finding of non-linear effects of fiscal policy reported in GJP (2000) is not robust. However, they do not imply that non-linearities in the relationship between fiscal policy and macroeconomic variables do not exist. Rather they indicate that panel data models imposing slope homogeneity across countries may not be the appropriate method to address this question. Further research will have to investigate whether non-linear effects of fiscal policy exist for individual countries. 
Conclusion
This (2000) who argue that highly significant, nonlinear effects for some determinants of national saving in panel data models may be spurious due to neglected crosscountry heterogeneity.
In the second part of the empirical application I tried to remedy the first of the above mentioned problems by proposing an alternative, time-invariant definition of fiscal consolidation episodes. When in 1992 the governments of European Union member states signed the Maastricht Treaty, they committed to sound public finances which in most cases implied reductions in public deficits in the run-up to monetary union. While the credibility of this commitment can be -and has extensively been -questioned, the attractive timeinvariance property of this consolidation measure has been employed in order to re-assess the case for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy. Notwithstanding, the panel results do not favor this
hypothesis. Yet, nonlinear effects could be detected in -admittedly crude -individual-country regressions, interestingly for countries with a high government debt -GDP ratio (Greece and Italy) or with rapidly rising debt (Germany).
This last result indicates that the analysis of individual-country experiences is a fruitful area of future empirical research. Of course, this comes at a cost. Results obtained for a specific country can not safely be generalized to other countries. In principle, general results could be expected from the estimation of panel data models. Nonetheless, valid inference about nonlinear effects necessitates a high degree of homogeneity across countries, a condition that obviously was not met by the panel analyzed in this study. In the recent past, the influence of fiscal policy on key macroeconomic variables in individual countries has been increasingly addressed in the structural VAR framework 18 . Most interesting regarding the question posed in this paper is the analysis of Neumann (2000) who has examined the case for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy in Germany employing a VAR model with time-varying coefficients. His results indicate that -as claimed by Alesina and Perotti (1995) -nonlinear effects can be related to the composition of fiscal consolidation programs rather than to their size and persistence. It should be borne in mind, however, that the economic profession is still far from a consensus about the appropriate way to identify (fiscal and monetary) policy effects in structural VAR models 19 .
All in all, the results indicate that the case for expansionary or non-Keynesian short-run effects of fiscal contractions is at most weak, contradicting the evidence presented in Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) . These findings may be important for policy making in EMU member states: in the present situation a number of countries have to decide whether to reduce budget deficits gradually or to make a single strong consolidation effort in order to comply with the medium-run provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. A need for additional time-series evidence on the effects of fiscal consolidation in individual countries arises in order to be able to give sound policy advice. However, the lack of high-frequency data on key fiscal variables for most European countries makes it difficult to capture the dynamic effects of fiscal policy. Source: OECD (2000a) 
